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Abstract 
In the post-Cold War international system, parliaments have gained a particular place in the dense 
network of international relations, traditionally monopolised by executives. Parliaments are 
increasingly expected to contribute to resolving complex foreign policy and international issues 
impacting more and more on citizens’ lives. The paper reflects on the gradual parliamentarisation of 
an EU polity so much dominated by Member States: foreign policy. It analyses the nature of the 
European Parliament’s actorhood in international relations, the EP’s emerging role in EU foreign 
policy as well as the tools and powers available to exert influence on the Union’s decisions and 
relations. It finally concludes that EU foreign policy can become efficient and democratic at the same 
time in the process of building an EU „representative democracy”. 
Keywords 
European Parliament, EU foreign policy, parliamentary diplomacy, parliamentary control, 
international relations. 
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“…take this as a maxim, that it is not enough to give things their beginning, direction, or impulse; we 
must also follow them up, and never slacken our efforts until they are brought to conclusion…”  
(Francesco Guicciardini, Florentine statesman and historian, 1530) 
Introduction* 
In ancient Greece, the role and aims of diplomatic missions were subject of open deliberations by the 
citizens in the assembly of the polis. Views on the required policies towards the other city states and 
how to execute them were discussed in a transparent manner. The polis’ envoy, upon arrival in the 
recipient city state, was expected to make a public statement in the local assembly to share the 
messages of his mission (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011). This, supposedly, was motivated by the 
need to create mutual trust to build a relationship on. 
History and the development of democracy, however, are not linear undertakings. What the ancient 
Greeks once considered being a pre-condition of inter-polis relations, i.e. a “foreign” policy pursued in 
a rather open and transparent manner, has not become an evident feature of international relations over 
time. Kings and monarchs soon monopolised on the handling of their relations with both friendly and 
hostile partners, cities, entities and, later, states. With the emergence of an international order based on 
nation states, the low focus on public scrutiny has become a systemic feature of diplomacy and a 
major institutionalised element in the conduct of a state’s foreign policy (Batora 2010: 18). Initiating 
external policies, formulating and representing the vital external interests and priorities of a 
community of citizens have emerged as a prerogative of the government, a particular branch of the 
state, where – as traditionally conceived - a considerable degree of flexibility, secrecy and rapid 
response (Albertini 2010: 1 and Foley 2007: 120) are required to successfully and efficiently promote 
those interests towards the outside world. Consequently, “instrumental efficiency” (Batora 2010: 2) 
rather than democratic participation (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 88) has become the traditional 
Leitmotiv of foreign policy. 
The twentieth century has seen significant changes in the handling of exclusive government 
privileges. The international system developing after World War II, with roots and initiatives in the 
pre-war period, has generated a strong need for more cooperation in which the executives, under the 
pressing circumstances of a bipolar international regime, take the lead and act on behalf of their states. 
International relations witnessed increasing institutionalisation.  
The end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its suppressive regime, 
produced more states than ever and also more democracies. Democracy, both as an ideal and a set of 
political institutions and practices, has triumphed in most of the countries of the world (Beetham 2006: 
1) and parliamentary democracy has spread world-wide: the number of electoral democracies has 
grown from only 30 in 1975 over some 66 in 1987 to 121 in 2003 (Emerson 2003 and Freedom 2003). 
Democracy has become a “universal value”, as recognised by the 2005 United Nations World Summit.  
In the post-Cold War era, new and other transnational actors and stakeholders including 
parliaments emerge to respond to the demands of an increasingly interconnected and institutionally 
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integrated world (Gram-Skjoldager 2011: 20), to growing economic interdependence and to ever-more 
complex global issues. The interdependence of the globalised world disrespects the boundaries 
between what is considered national and what international authority (Gram-Skjoldager 2011: 6). 
Alternative centres of international analysis and activism (non-governmental organisations, advocacy 
groups, representation of corporate interests etc.) provide their own interpretation of the new 
international order along their own interests, priorities and goals (Foley 2007: 127) resulting in the 
“disintegration” of traditional government dominance in international relations and foreign policy. 
According to Thym, “the new pluralism of international actors challenges the traditional assumption of 
uniform external relations which is conducted by the executive” (Thym 2009: 315).  
The expansion of the model of liberal democracy throughout the world also meant that 
parliamentarism as a means to legitimise complex government policies and initiatives has become 
widely accepted. In democratic societies it is increasingly difficult to sustain the traditional notion that 
foreign policy is incompatible with democratic decision-making and scrutiny (Batora 2010: 1) and that 
state sovereignty in that domain is the exclusive, unquestionable competence of governments, as the 
perceived sole representative of the state. Contrary to their predecessors, today’s political leaders do 
not only have to master domestic pressures triggered by media and public opinion but they are 
expected to act within democratic arrangements (Krotz and Maher 2011: 573) when promoting 
policies and pursuing “complex diplomacy” (Kerr and Wiseman 2013: 343). Acknowledging that 
foreign and security policy, and international law and politics in general, have a direct (and sometimes 
dramatic) effect on citizens’ lives in today’s globalised and interconnected world, their backing by 
citizen representatives is necessary to achieve public acceptance and trust of these policies. The view, 
however, continues to prevail that the public is not fit to be heard in foreign policy decision-making 
given the peculiar nature of this field of interaction. 
On the other hand, a considerable disillusionment and public apathy are increasingly present in 
modern liberal democracies (Beetham 2006: 1). In many countries, the parliament, the core institution 
of democracy, is facing a legitimacy crisis. While suffering a decline in public confidence (Welle 
2013: 21), simultaneously policy-makers risk being overwhelmed with the growing demand for highly 
specialised expertise (Peters et al. 2011: 1). They are increasingly challenged by the need to strike a 
balance between legitimacy (the sense of common identity creating reciprocity and solidarity) and 
efficiency (rapid decisions, clear control, good feedback etc.) to achieve efficacy (Welle 2013: 26). 
Can foreign policy be democratic and efficient at the same time? The response concerns no less than 
the quality of democracy we aspire. 
The present paper aims at examining the role and functions of parliaments in shaping and 
controlling foreign policy, with a strong focus on the European Parliament’s post-Lisbon role and 
competences in parliamentary diplomacy and oversight.  
1. Shaping and controlling foreign policy: parliamentary diplomacy and oversight  
1.1 Foreign policy and diplomacy 
The scope and content of the terms “foreign policy” and “diplomacy” have significantly widened, 
particularly under the new international circumstances of the post-Cold War period. It continues to 
consist, as all other policies, of a particular set of objectives which a state wants to attain in its 
relations with international partners (Hamilton 2010: 2). Today hardly any subject seems to escape 
being the legitimate subject of international relations (Berridge and James 2003: ix). While, 
traditionally, foreign policy has always comprised those policies of security, defence and diplomacy 
which a state pursued in relation to the outside world (Ibid: 107), today’s comprehensive 
understanding of this policy domain comprises not only these fields of “high politics” (Rana 2011: 17) 
but also other areas like economic policy, development policy, international trade (Thym 2009: 312) 
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as well as a growing number of the external aspects of some domestic policy fields i.e. environment 
policy, home affairs, data protection, just to name a few. A widening scope of foreign policy also adds 
to the growing politicisation of this policy domain. 
Diplomacy, in a narrow sense, has remained unchanged: the conduct and method of a state to 
promote its interests externally, primarily in the form of negotiation and through officials based in the 
capital or deployed abroad (Berridge and James 2003: 70). Diplomacy means formalised relations 
usually between independent political entities, generally states, for the purpose of attaining strategic 
goals and achieving mutually beneficial results (Hamilton 2010: 2-3.). It is often considered being 
synonymous to foreign or external affairs, which basically mean the conduct of foreign policy.  
In a wider sense, however, twenty-first century diplomacy is defined as a process of 
communication and representation aimed at facilitating interaction between different entities and 
individuals (Kerr and Wiseman 2013: 4), not exclusively states. Diplomacy is not simply “diplomacy” 
anymore but commercial diplomacy, economic diplomacy, business diplomacy, open diplomacy, 
coercive diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, bomber diplomacy, paradiplomacy etc. 
and…parliamentary diplomacy. Consequently, the range of international actors has considerably 
expanded already comprising, beside governments, other state actors like parliaments, non-state actors 
or “para-diplomatic actors” such as international organisations, NGOs, civil society groups, 
multinational companies, financial corporations and various individuals as well. They create a dense 
network of international relations (Gram-Skjoldager 2011: 1) in scope and intensity never experienced 
before. In this web of interactions between a multiplicity of actors, parliaments have gained a 
particular place. 
1.2 Parliamentary diplomacy and “open international relations” 
In the first point of Woodrow Wilson’s famous fourteen points, which set out his very principles of the 
post-World War I international regime, the US President expressed the view that “open covenants of 
peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind 
but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.” Later, when explaining in more 
detail his stance in a letter addressed to the Secretary of State Robert Lansing on 12 March 1918, he 
went on to opine that “...when I pronounced for open diplomacy, I meant not that there should be no 
private discussions of delicate matters, but that no secret agreement of any sort should be entered into 
and that all international relations, when fixed, should be open, above board, and explicit” (Quoted by 
Berridge and James 2003).  
Certainly, he - in 1918 - did not have explicitly parliaments in mind when discussing, in a perhaps 
premature manner, his ideals of new and open international relations based on more transparency and 
public involvement. He might have echoed the views of British Prime Minister Palmerston, who 
acknowledged a couple of decades earlier that “...opinions are stronger than armies and may in the end 
prevail against the bayonets of infantry, the force of artillery and the changes of cavalry” (Quoted by 
Lloveras 2011: 7).  
According to the democratic doctrine of “open international relations”, the public’s opinion matters 
as does the public demand for more transparency in decision-making in foreign policy and 
international politics. Although in the exclusive world of diplomats there was/is little sympathy for 
openness (Kerr and Wiseman 2013: 196), the public has become increasingly aware about the impact 
those diplomats’ activities have on their lives (Nowotny 2011: 155). Growing sensitivity resonates in 
parliaments, among those people elected to “have a fine-tuned sense” of the policies, interests and 
priorities and to be able to translate them into instructions to government, resulting in greater 
parliamentary involvement in shaping and controlling foreign policies. Parliaments as institutions and 
the citizens’ elected representatives individually are expected to contribute to resolving complex 
foreign policy and international issues impacting on citizens’ lives. Such particular parliamentary 
activities are often defined as parliamentary diplomacy. 
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There seems to be no overall agreement on what exact scope and content parliamentary diplomacy 
entail. The term might even be misleading since “diplomacy”, in a narrow sense as we have seen 
before, is about the method of promoting state interests, primarily in the form of negotiation (of 
agreements or “diploma”), and parliamentarians are normally not involved in such (government) 
activities.  
Parliamentary diplomacy refers to a wide range of activities undertaken by members of parliament, 
or parliament as an institution, to increase mutual understanding between countries and to improve 
scrutiny of government (Weisglas and de Boer 2007: 93). Its objective is, as in other fields of 
parliamentary policy-making, to influence government decisions (Squarcialopi quoted in Sabic 2013: 
26) on behalf of the citizens. It is often, but not exclusively, referred to in the framework of open and 
multilateral diplomacy (Berridge and James 2003: 199). In a broad sense, parliamentary diplomacy is 
about the construction of state actors, about the pooling of power and about common ideals (Götz 
2005: 276). If so, what sort of state actor other than government is parliament? 
With democratisation expanding around the globe, the number of regional and other parliamentary 
organisations has been steadily increasing and the intensity of inter-parliamentary contacts growing. 
They vary greatly as to the scope and content of their activities, their mandates and statutes according 
to which they operate, their formal or informal ambition, authority and abilities, their size and 
financial/institutional resources, and, in general, as to their role/involvement in foreign policy and 
international relations. International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs) comprising some 70 organs 
today (Sabic 2013: 20) and ranging from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (established in 1889) over the 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (1949) or the Central-American Parliament (1975) to the 
Andean Parliament (1979) or the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (1991), do operate as parliamentary 
assemblies and their members are delegated from the national parliaments of member countries. 
Contrary to directly elected parliaments such as national parliaments or the European Parliament, 
which can inter alia pass legislation, decide the budget and hold the executive accountable, 
international parliamentary assemblies do not enjoy direct powers, they are not mandated directly by 
citizens, neither are they directly responsible to them and therefore, in general, their 
involvement/impact in parliamentary diplomacy appears rather limited. They primarily engage in 
inter-parliamentary cooperation on the international scene by debating and adopting non-binding 
recommendations on pressing regional and international issues of common concern with the 
expectation to be able to influence related government policies and international developments. 
What “unites” though all parliamentary organs is that they do not operate in a vacuum but in 
(different) relation to respective government, the main body administering policies in this domain. 
Their role as new players in the international arena is not to duplicate, replace or compete with 
governments but to complement, enrich and stimulate policies of wider implications, to provide 
impulses, direction and follow up. Members of Parliament and parliaments as institutions can bring 
experience and expertise in bilateral or multilateral conflict prevention, in political dialogue (Hamilton 
2010: 4), they can provide the necessary flexibility in sensitive situations since their actions do not 
necessarily commit governments (Weisglas-de Boer 2007: 96) and they may have useful access to 
non-official channels as well.  
Still, in the case of directly elected parliamentary bodies, they - as an institution of the state/entity – 
can act on behalf of that particular state/entity, strengthened by the democratic legitimacy they enjoy. 
In addition, supporting the policies of the government, another institution of a particular state or entity, 
provides more legitimacy and more political weight resulting, principally, in greater leverage and 
impact on partners (Fiott 2011: 2). Although it is widely assumed in government circles that a greater 
parliamentary involvement in foreign policy/international relations would diminish their (traditionally 
perceived) roles, the gains can be mutually beneficial provided broad policies are jointly designed and 
their relations are built on mutual trust. Otherwise, a parliament may tend to develop an own foreign 
policy if pre-conditions to do so, such as authority, ability, attitude and ambition, are given – however, 
this may put at risk coherent state/entity actions in foreign policy. 
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One of the constraints to a distinct parliamentary foreign policy is the particular constitutional 
arrangements in which directly elected national parliaments normally operate in liberal electoral 
democracies. Parliaments are dominated by the parliamentary majority, which can be considered as 
the “prolonged arm” of the executive branch or vice versa. Usually, members of the majority parties 
are politically committed to their government since its members, or the Prime Minister at least, 
emerge from their majority as a result of elections. A government tends to inform its own 
parliamentary majority much earlier than the opposition (Crum and Fossum 2011: 113) and makes 
sure that the decisions of the democratic majority are carried out (Lord 2011: 239). In such cases, the 
role of parliament generally remains to provide support and legitimacy to actions by the executive and 
not necessarily restraint it from action (Bradley and Ziegler and Baranger 2007: 11). If so, are 
parliaments still sovereign players or are their activities compromised to a given extent? Under such 
circumstances, the ambition of parliament(ary majority) to act independently from government 
policies – especially in foreign policy, a domain so much dominated by the executive - is rather 
limited. Consequently, where the legislature is less "constrained" by its relation to government, 
parliament may have the potential to pursue own policy (Whitaker 2011: 10) i.e. the more a parliament 
has the authority, ability, attitude and ambition to act apart from government the more it is (ready to 
be) involved in the shaping of the foreign policy of the state/entity. The European Parliament provides 
a good example to this end.  
How much influence and impact do parliaments have on foreign policies? A 2004 survey 
conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) showed that all of its member parliaments are, to 
different extent and manner, involved in international affairs by applying various tools at their disposal 
(Beetham 2006: 2). All of them have important constitutional roles in ratifying international 
agreements and contributing to government-led international negotiations by monitoring and following 
up them. Activities of parliamentary diplomacy include inter alia contribution to conflict resolution, 
the sending of envoys to peace processes and the participation in government delegations to 
international conferences as well as in global, regional and other inter-parliamentary forums. In all of 
the activities of their parliamentary diplomacy, elected representatives seem to grapple with same sort 
of challenges irrespective of geographical location or the given legal authority: information gathering, 
dissemination of information and the citizens’ involvement in the mechanism of foreign policy 
decision-making.  
1.3 Tools and means of parliamentary oversight 
While the main aim of parliamentary diplomacy is to make an impact on third countries and on related 
government policies, parliamentary control focuses primarily on, as mandated by the citizens, 
exercising influence internally, i.e. on the way decisions are taken by the government. These major 
fields of parliamentary activity, however, are interconnected and interdependent – policies are being 
shaped when exercising control and vice versa.  
A number of terms are used for parliament’s involvement in controlling government activities and 
there appears to be neither a consensus on their definition, nor a clear-cut distinction between them 
and often they overlap. “Parliamentary accountability” refers to the process in which the executive is 
held responsible by the legislature for policy decisions and implementation (Wouters-Rabe 2012: 
150), while “parliamentary control” entails powers to sanction (Ibid). Under the less ambitious 
concept of “parliamentary scrutiny”, parliaments oversee a policy field and it entails the ability and 
ambition of parliament to be informed and consulted (Ibid). Oversight in general relates to 
parliamentary activities aimed at evaluating the implementation of policies (McCubbins and Schwartz 
(1984) quoted in Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2012: 14). All control mechanisms usually relate to policy-
making and the executive needs to explain, legitimize and justify actions/policies based on the formal 
or informal arrangements reached with the legislature – parliament can raise questions and provide an 
assessment with possible consequences/sanctions for the executive (Batora 2010: 4), which could even 
lead to rejection of action or policy line (Wouters and Raube 2012: 150). Parliamentary control is 
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political by nature in which the legislature, acting on behalf of the public, assesses whether the choices 
made of actions and policies are “politically appropriate” (Gusy 2007: 128). 
Oversight tools are developed in order to bridge the gap of “information asymmetry” between the 
executive and the legislature for the sake of the parliament being able to assess (the choices for) 
actions and policies. The four main instruments of parliamentary oversight concern committees and 
special commissions of inquiry, confirmation of appointments, (written or oral) questions and 
interpellations as well as public debates in plenary or committees. Other tools often used are inter alia 
the motions for debate, resolutions, recommendations and reports, committee hearings as well as 
financial/budgetary control (Gusy 2007: 132). Although the highest number of oversight tools exist in 
parliamentary systems and the lowest in presidential ones, there appears to be no correlation between 
the number of tools/capacities available and the quality of democracy (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2012: 
58) in a particular political system. For instance, although in the American presidential system the 
Congress/Senate employ three times less tools than the parliament of Bangladesh, the US 
parliamentary control mechanisms are much more effective in scrutinizing actions and policies of the 
executive. Consequently, the scope and content of parliamentary control is determined by how 
effectively the oversight tools are used (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2012: 70).  
In democratic systems, oversight instruments are applied in all policy areas including in foreign 
affairs. However, although democratization has expanded and parliamentarism as means of 
legitimizing government policies has become widely accepted in recent decades, parliamentary control 
of foreign policy continues to lag behind the oversight of internal policies (Thym 2008: 1). The realist 
view continues to strongly prevail, notably that, given the nature of foreign policy, effective 
government actions in this field require greater independence from the legislature (Nowotny 2011: 
146). Despite repeated calls for more democratic accountability in this field, also because of deepening 
links between internal and foreign policies of modern states (Batora 2010: 5), parliaments continue to 
have rather limited influence over foreign policy decisions. It is often argued that increased 
parliamentary control may constrain government actions (Kearnan 2013: 33) and the ability for 
making the necessary rapid decisions in a rather flexible manner considering the international 
environment and the third party actors operating therein. Security policy in particular is viewed as a 
field where only limited democratic participation and parliamentary control should be applied (Peters 
et al. 2008: 4) in order not to undermine a government’s scope of maneuver in safeguarding national 
security and in deciding on interests, priorities and objectives of action. In this context, the executive’s 
exposure to a diversity of views initiated and debated in the public domain of a parliament, realists 
warn, would undermine the efficiency of foreign policy (Ikenberry 2002).  
According to opposite views, there are no principled arguments why foreign (and security) policy 
should only allow for limited maneuver for parliamentary control in a democratic system. Indeed, this 
is the field where parliamentary control is of particular relevance not only due to the growing impact 
of international acts on internal legislation but also because this is a highly politicized area where 
value-choices are made with high potential for long-lasting implications for the citizens and therefore 
requiring direct or indirect parliamentary approval. Consequently, “in cases of collision between the 
requirements for information on the one hand and maintenance of secrecy on the other the issue has to 
be less of “whether” than rather of “how” (Gusy 2007: 136). 
2. The European Parliament: a new actor in the international arena 
With the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the bipolar world a new 
international order has emerged, fundamentally affecting the European continent. Stronger 
internationalization and wide-spread democratization have marked new features of the international 
system. On the ruins of totalitarian regimes new democracies have been established and the public, 
political and economic demand for not simply an enlargement of the European integration process to 
the East but for the unification of Europe has mobilized minds and souls on both sides of the former 
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East-West border. The central “founding” values of the early years and decades of European 
integration – such as peace, prosperity and supranationality – have been enriched and complemented 
with a new focus on democracy, human rights and the rule of law as from the beginning of the 1990s 
(Weiler 2014).  
Also, a rather inward-looking and introverted European integration process was transformed by its 
main stakeholders, the Member States, into an institutional and policy framework more open to a 
fundamentally changed international environment. Preceded already by the formalization of the 
European Political Cooperation under the 1986 Single European Act, the 1993 Maastricht Treaty 
created the European Union and reinforced the EU’s rule-based competences in external 
relations/foreign policy also by establishing the Common Foreign and Security Policy as one of the 
pillars of the new architecture – a value-based policy field aimed at internal and external interaction to 
defend and promote the common values and interests of Member States. Simultaneously, the changing 
international environment and the democratization process combined with growing public demand for 
more transparency have created the need for a more democratic EU decision-making to be reinforced 
with the European Parliament at its core. Parliamentary involvement in decision-making reflected 
upon the democratic principle that people should participate in the exercise of power through their 
elected representatives (Kuiper 2013: 869) 
2.1 Legitimacy, actorhood and impact 
The European Union is widely considered a kind of “unidentified political object” (Jacques Delors 
quoted in Zielonka 2013: 1), a sui generis political actor, a normative power with sovereignty (and 
policy impetus) shared between Member States and various institutional players (Cameron 2012: xiv). 
No other international organization involves as many players interacting on as many different levels of 
governance as the EU, leading to a high complexity of decision-making (Welle 2013: 7). In this 
peculiar complex web, the Union entertains a “tripartite” way of approaching the world outside trough 
intergovernmental and supranational methods/bodies and via its own Member States (Abdelal and 
Krotz 201: 2. and 5). 
The international system is largely determined by the actions of state actors and non-state actors as 
well as the interaction between them. While the state actors (government and parliament), dominated 
traditionally by executives, enjoy legitimate rights and responsibilities in forming opinions and 
making decisions, so-called non-state actors (NGOs, multinational companies, advocacy groups etc.) 
are entrusted with rights without legitimate responsibilities (they indeed form opinions without making 
legitimate decisions). The European Union, having the potential for autonomous action and impact, 
acts as a peculiar “state-like” actor in foreign policy and international relations. But does its 
Parliament, a particular institutional part of this state-like entity, qualify as a genuine actor in EU 
foreign policy and on the international scene? 
2.1.1. The nature of EP actorhood 
Under the peculiar democratic order of the EU (Magnette and Nikolaidis 2009: 54) recognized as a 
“representative democracy” since the Lisbon Treaty (Article 10(1) TEU), no government is emerging 
directly as a result of European elections. For the time being voters can not sanction the executive, 
elections are currently not about keeping or removing the Commission. In this sense, the widely 
perceived democratic deficit is a “structural one” since EU voters have no choice on how to be 
governed (Weiler 2014). Unlike in national parliaments of EU Member States but like in the US 
Congress, however, the parliamentary majority in the EP is not “the prolonged arm” of the other 
“state-like” branch. Currently, their MEPs are not “mouthpieces” of the executive, their policy 
approach or value choices are not necessarily determined by political affiliation to the Commission.  
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Under the traditional democratic arrangements of government-parliament structure, the 
parliamentary majority normally tends to constrain itself in pursuing (foreign) policy positions 
different from that of its government (Monar quoted by Viola 2000: 28). The majority, which 
determines the political orientation of the House, usually identifies itself with the government line and 
prefers to refrain from pursuing autonomous (foreign) policy. As Thym put it, “in international 
relations, this support is even more pronounced than in domestic policies, where parliamentarians are 
inclined to stand up for the specific interests of their constituency or social support groups” (Thym 
2011: 8). 
In contrast, the absence in the European Parliament of such a rather “restrictive” institutional set up 
provides the opportunity for MEPs to take foreign policy positions and views freely without being 
politically obliged to support the position of the Council, the HR/VP and the Commission, which 
together are the executive organs of EU foreign policy. Consequently, the EP enjoys a rather wide-
spread political autonomy, the potential for developing an own policy identity coupled with 
independent legitimacy with the ambition for independent actions – this provides the opportunity to 
pursue an autonomous foreign policy not necessarily in line with the actions pursued by the other 
institutional actors (Thym 2011: 24. and Zanon 2005: 107). But can this potential created by the 
qualitative institutional difference be translated into impact/influence in a policy field so much 
dominated by executive actors?  
2.1.2. Making impact, exerting influence 
The main requirement of actorhood in the international system, i.e. to be recognized as an actor, is the 
ability to make an impact and exert influence internally (on related decisions) and externally (on third 
parties and on international relations overall). An actor disposes of the capability of internal cohesion 
and of being “discernible” from the external environment (Sjoestedt quoted in Viola 2000: 2).  
For long the European Parliament used to be considered “immature”, an unreliable actor not 
capable to act responsibly, a body just releasing reports, haggling over budget lines (Lalone 2005: 46 
and 48) and acting as a talking shop with a declamatory character (Viola 2000: 39) – their positions 
carried little weight, therefore not to be taken seriously by Member States. 
But such an image was to be changed, talking power to be complemented with smart power, due to 
factors discussed above. Within the context of democratization and growing public (and 
parliamentary) demand for a more democratic EU regime, a gradual parliamentarisation of EU polity 
took place in the last more than thirty years (since the first direct election of MEPs in 1979).
1
 The five 
major revisions of the Treaty since then have increasingly affected the European Parliament, 
entrusting it with new legislative and budgetary powers. Indeed, expanding EU competences in certain 
fields, including foreign policy, have been accompanied by stronger parliamentary dimension of those 
policy areas. As a matter of fact, however, the Parliament has not become an equal player in all fields 
of European external action and it has been more substantially empowered with respect to internal EU 
policies than in the sphere of external action.  
Relevant treaty changes in favor of reinforcing parliamentary involvement have been largely 
conceived in the EP as opportunities to build up internal capacities, provide more expertise in order to 
improve internal/external reputation, enhance credibility and raise its international profile. Internal 
reforms such as the Raising the Game in 2003-2004 were, on the one hand, a reflection of the EP’s 
determination to this end and, on the other, to back up more competences with more capacities and 
expertise, also in order to be able to maximize its involvement in foreign affairs (Keukeleire-Delreux 
                                                     
1
 The European Parliament is not the only IPI, which is directly elected and enjoys legislative powers. For instance, the 
Andean Parliament (PARLANDINO), is a directly elected body and the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) is 
entrusted with legislative competences. However, the EP is the only directly elected supranational legislature in the 
world.  
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2014).
2
 The EP turned itself more and more into a “working parliament” where MEPs become heavily 
specialized and which is increasingly focused on legislative actions (Crum and Fossum 2013: 259).
3
 
Expanding competences combined with more expertise have made the EP capable to project a united 
and consistent image, both internally and externally, and, above all, to be able to make an impact on 
EU decisions and third countries as well.  
However, real (parliamentary) impact is difficult to measure, in particular as regards foreign policy 
where informal factors play a significant role. Indeed, this is the field where, due to the absence of 
formal legislative powers especially in hard foreign and security policy, the potential of impact can 
also be decisive in shaping policy – executives often anticipate parliamentary reactions, calculate the 
costs and consequences of parliamentary satisfaction or dissatisfaction when making foreign policy 
choices (Carter and Scott 2012: 241). Former Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy was quoted as 
calculating that EP support for his policy actions would strengthen his position both in WTO 
negotiations and within the Commission itself (Lalone 2005: 47). Research into the EP’s handling of 
the Yugoslav crisis in 1991/1992 suggests that, despite the EU’s evident failure to prevent the armed 
conflict, parliamentary involvement was useful in publicizing issues and mobilizing public opinion as 
well as in strengthening internal parliamentary cohesion on a sensitive foreign policy matter (Viola 
2000: 177). In another instance, MEPs were perceived to have played a decisive role in contributing to 
(an unusually) peaceful and democratic transition of power in Albania after the 2013 elections or in 
resolving a domestic political crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in early 2013. 
In most of these instances, the EP exerted moral force and provided the EU action with “soft 
legitimacy”. Over the years, the Parliament has built up a reputation of guardian of European values 
and strong supporter of human rights worldwide. A promoter of democracy and the rule of law, a 
driving force on political conditionality in EU foreign policy. According to the former Chair of the 
EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee, this is not exercised formally, not apparent in any legal process but 
taken on board informally by the Council and Commission (Saryusz-Wolski quoted in Bickerton 
2011: 104).  
Foreign policy and external actions are policy fields primarily of strategic nature, where – in 
contrast to pre-dominantly rule-based internal policies – non-legislative decisions and informal factors 
play a decisive role in pursuing interests and objectives. This necessarily limits parliamentary 
involvement. Consequently, the limited role of legislative/budgetary actions coupled with the Member 
State’s reluctance to share (all of the executive’s) sovereignty are the two main factors which 
inevitably restraint the impact and influence of the European Parliament on the conduct and direction 
of EU foreign policy. In this context, the “effect of hopelessness”, an element of inability and 
frustration to be able to impact on EU foreign policy, are apparent among Members (MEP quoted by 
Viola 2000: 248).  
3. Shaping and controlling EU foreign policy in a post-Lisbon framework: role, 
competences, tools and bodies of parliamentary diplomacy and oversight 
As discussed before, the five main treaty changes of the last thirty years entrusting the European 
Parliament with more legislative and budgetary powers have been a response, on the one hand, to the 
democratisation process of the post-Cold war era and, on the other, to growing public (and 
parliamentary) demand for more democratic legitimacy of the EU. These changes have been 
                                                     
2
 Further reinforcement of capacities - for instance internal expertise on specific crisis areas/crisis-related topics, their rapid 
deployment combined with rapid provision of external expert support – is still to be considered in order to avoid risks of 
overstretching the available limited capacities and so weakening EP ability to pursue legislative and political priorities.  
3
 This focus is not necessarily a favourable development for EP bodies working in the field of foreign affairs given the 
peculiar nature of this policy area where informal debates, exchanges and a number of non-legislative actions constitute 
important instruments in shaping and controlling policy (See also Crum and Fossum 2013: 259). 
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accompanied, but also generated, by constant inter-institutional battles over competences, on the 
extent of influence over policy-making in the EU context. This particularly applies to foreign policy 
and external action, dominated traditionally so much by the Member State governments and where 
informal factors as well as soft power play a crucial role. The EP’s growing ambition, authority, 
ability and attitude in this field have fuelled into inter-institutional tensions. Legislative activism, the 
“obsession to enhance its own powers” (Grant et al. 2013: 25), has made a number of observers to 
argue that there is no need for more powers of the EP at this stage of European integration (see for 
instance Ibid and Rossi 2011: 106).  
The European Parliament’s overall role is to translate the values, interests, policy choices of EU 
citizens into binding and non-binding instructions to the executive conducting European external 
action. Parliamentary involvement in this regard relates to the shaping of the policy and controlling of 
the policy implementation by the executive. These two main fields of parliamentary activity, 
parliamentary “diplomacy” and oversight, cannot be artificially distinguished, because they are 
interconnected and interdependent fields – the policy is being shaped also when exercising control and 
the other way around. The EP enjoys a well-established institutional set-up with available tools and 
instruments to ensure a wide-ranging, bilateral, multilateral, regional and global reach in the 
international system. 
3.1. Hard (legislative) powers 
The Lisbon Treaty created opportunities for the future development of EU foreign policy, also by 
codifying for the first time the clear values, objectives and principles in this domain. It stipulated a 
greater role for the EP in external actions overall by expanding parliamentary legitimacy and 
oversight. What originally used to be under the Single European Act (Article 30. SEA) a 
parliamentary right to be regularly informed on the European Political Cooperation and to be closely 
associated with the EPC was substantially extended in 2009 and complemented with additional 
legislative and budgetary powers. Overall, consultation and information rights have been extended in 
both legislative and non-legislative actions, legal procedures of consent and co-decision made the 
norm as well as budgetary provisions on CFSP reinforced. A “Treaty of Parliaments” (Elmar Brok 
quoted in Beichelt 2012: 143) was created by increasing EP powers and significantly boosting the role 
of EU MS national parliaments. Nevertheless, formal (hard) powers have not been extended to all 
fields of European external action and Parliament continues not to have control functions over the 
Council’s competences in the field of CFSP.  
3.1.1 Consent to all international agreements 
3.1.1.2 Accession 
One of the most important powers of the EP in EU external action has been maintained by the Lisbon 
Treaty (only the name changed from assent to consent procedure): parliamentary consent continues to 
be required for the accession of a new Member State to the EU, before the conclusion of the Accession 
Treaty by the Council and its ratification by all Member States. Although formally Parliament is only 
entitled to approve or reject accession, it still enjoys tremendous impact on both the internal and 
external conditions of the enlargement process, the “most successful EU foreign policy field”, due to a 
combination of formal and informal powers and a variety of tools and instruments available. In 
addition, impact is also “facilitated” by inter-institutional collaboration, in particular long years of 
practice of very close working cooperation between Parliament and Commission. 
3.1.1.3Other international agreements 
The Lisbon Treaty unified the procedures on the conclusion of international agreements and now 
basically all such EU agreements require the consent by Parliament before conclusion by the Council 
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(Article 218. TFEU). The EP gaining an authoritative role in this domain is the most important 
increase in Parliament’s competences in the field of the Union’s treaty-making competences. 
Formally and according to its rule-based powers, the Parliament is not entitled to modify the 
agreement. It is widely expected by the Council and Commission to endorse a text negotiated behind 
closed doors and on the basis of a mandate (negotiating directive) not being subject to formal 
parliamentary involvement. The arguments by the executive for doing so are well-known: successful 
international negotiations require secrecy, expertise and flexibility which are incompatible with 
parliamentary control (Thym 2009: 315). Consequently, room of formal parliamentary manoeuvre is 
limited. 
However, the EP has often been reluctant to merely passively take note of the request for consent 
but has been determined to influence the negotiations by providing ex ante control as well (Rossi 
2011: 102). Its overall aim is not to act as a rubber-stamp but to influence the content of the agreement 
(Passos 2011: 54) according to its own views directly legitimated by EU citizens, and, by doing so, to 
shape policy. The primary instruments to act so are parliamentary resolutions, which formulate 
Parliament’s positions, provide conditions for consent, a sort of “second mandate” to be considered by 
the Council and the Commission (Ibid: 55) and therefore facilitate consent. They often but not 
exclusively refer to political conditionality like human rights considerations, good governance, the 
functioning of democracy and the rule of law as well as social and labour issues. However, there is 
normally only little or no feedback from Commission and Council services whether EP positions have 
been actually taken into account since draft agreements are not shared with the Parliament. 
In order to shape policy, i.e. to define (and be able to defend) credible and substantial positions, 
systematic access to relevant information appears to be crucial. The Lisbon Treaty clearly set the legal 
framework by stipulating that Parliament “...shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of 
the procedure” (Article 218(10) TFEU). Practice, however, looks different. The EEAS often appears 
to be reticent to share documents with the Parliament because it fears they would end up in the public 
domain. Everyday practice, although improving, still shows that the EEAS seldom takes initiative and 
it is the EP which has to enquire about the next round of negotiations or request debriefings. Indeed, 
the Council is regularly informed about the negotiation process through comitology, while the EP has 
no formal say over the negotiation directive deciding on the launch of talks. Despite the fact that 
Article 218(10) applies to all kinds of information, including classified ones, without laying down any 
exceptions, mandates are considered classified information by the Council and therefore, if MEPs 
wish to access them, they have to follow a cumbersome procedure. Currently, the Council limits 
access to rapporteurs and political group coordinators – repeated calls by Parliament to expand this 
scope to office holders, including shadow rapporteurs, on “need-to-know-basis” has produced no 
result yet. Council also critically and suspiciously views the 2010 EP-Commission Framework 
Agreement, under which the Commission accepted to provide all relevant information during the 
negotiation process that it also provides to the Council. Lack of information or difficulties in accessing 
them at any stage of the procedure do not facilitate Parliament’s consent, and therefore, overall, may 
occasionally bear negative consequences for the EU’s bilateral relations. 
Parliament has rarely rejected consent to an international agreement but sometimes delayed 
approval on purpose in order to ensure its positions to be taken into account in the final text of the 
agreement (for instance, agreements with Israel, Turkmenistan, Syria or Morocco) (Corbett and Jacobs 
and Shakleton 2011: 343). The 2010 EU-US SWIFT agreement on the sharing of financial data, when 
the EP overwhelmingly voted against consent, has set a well-known precedent with significant 
implications for EU external relations (Monar 2010: 143). Despite repeated early warnings by 
Parliament to this end, many of its substantive concerns have been disregarded, by doing so putting at 
risk the EU’s international credibility. In fact, the rejection of the agreement was not only a 
spectacular signal of the changed inter-institutional power balance following the Lisbon Treaty and 
that majority support in the European Parliament may not be taken as granted, as might be the case in 
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national parliaments dominated by government majorities. It was also a proof that the EP has the 
ability and ambition to shape EU external action on its own.  
3.1.2 Co-decision in European external action 
3.1.2.1 Common Commercial Policy (CCP) 
A substantial change as to the EP’s hard powers occurred in particular in the field of the Common 
Commercial Policy. An area, with no EP role at all and which had not even been subject to 
consultation pre-Lisbon, has become a sphere of significant potential impact to be exerted by the EP 
following the entry into force of the new Treaty. According to Article 207 TFEU, all autonomous 
measures under the CCP (trade defence instruments, General System of Preferences, antidumping, 
rules of origin etc.) have become subject to the ordinary legislative procedure. By formally 
acknowledging the EP as an equal player with the Council in this legislative competence, the 
Parliament has been entrusted with a decisive role in legitimising CCP actions. This power was first 
used in providing a safeguard clause to the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement in 2010 (Corbett 
and Jacobs and Shakleton 2011: 254). 
3.1.2.2. External Financial Instruments 
When examining the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty with respect to parliamentary 
involvement in shaping and controlling European external action, a widely “forgotten” innovation 
relates to European external cooperation assistance. Either it is examined as part of new budgetary 
provisions or simply neglected.  
The EU’s cooperation assistance to third countries is implemented through external financial 
assistance instruments which are managed by the Commission and the EEAS. They are major vehicles 
of EU foreign policy as they lay down the EU’s guiding principles and objectives under Article 21 
TEU and Articles 207, 208, 209 and 212 TFEU.  
Under Article 212(2) TFEU, the field of economic financial and technical measures including 
assistance to third countries has become subject to the ordinary legislative procedure. Following the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament not only co-decides with the Council on the 
development cooperation instrument (DCI), as before, but also on the financing aspects of all other 
instruments (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, Instrument for European Neighbourhood Policy 
Initiative, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, Partnership Instrument and European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights). This includes co-legislative functions both on deciding 
the seven-year budgets available to the individual instruments under Heading 4 (External Action) of 
the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the strategic objectives, thematic priorities, 
financing and implementing modalities of assistance. Consequently, Parliament enjoys, on equal 
footing with the Council, formal policy-making powers in this field. 
As a result of eighteen months of inter-institutional negotiations on Heading 4 of the MFF 2014-
2020, Parliament was able to ensure that the instruments are flexible and complementary, whilst also 
addressing longer term strategic programming interests, that they have proper budgets to meet the 
ambition and strategic interests of the Union, that European external action is provided with more 
transparency and visibility, and not least that human rights, democracy promotion and the rule of law 
are mainstreamed and entrusted with more conditionality.  
In fact, the newly acquired formal powers are stronger than the new EP competence to give consent 
to basically all international agreements, since this allows Parliament to formally shape, on equal 
footing with the Council, European external action and not simply approve or refuse an agreement. 
Democratic and efficient foreign policy? 
13 
3.1.3 Budgetary powers 
The legislative competence to decide over the budget is a classical parliamentary hard power. The 
European Parliament approves the EU’s seven-year budget under the Multiannual Financial 
Framework, including its Heading 4 on European External Action, endorses the annual budgets and 
controls spending of the Institutions via the discharge procedure. Such formal role provides the 
opportunity not only to approve budgetary headings and items but to exert influence on the policy 
actions behind. 
There is, however, no full control. Although the Lisbon Treaty made the CFSP budget, including 
the EEAS budget, part of the EU budget and so subject to annual parliamentary approval, EP 
budgetary powers remain rather limited in CFSP. MEPs are formally not consulted before the adoption 
of individual CFSP decisions with budgetary implications and the EP is not involved at all into 
deciding on expenditures of EU military missions because they do not form part of the EU budget but 
they are directly financed by EU Member States under the Athena mechanism (“costs lie where they 
fall”). The spending on military missions appears as a “shadow budget” with no parliamentary control 
whatsoever (Brok and Gresch 2004: 220).  
3.2 Soft (non-legislative) powers 
Contrary to many EU national parliaments operating under the “constraints” of their parliamentary 
systems with majorities dominated by their governments in policy-making, the European Parliament 
and its influential Members always had the ambition and attitude to maximise parliamentary authority 
and make full use of the acquired formal powers for the sake of bringing European integration 
forward. Ambition and attitude being even stronger driving forces in areas not falling under the remit 
of hard legislative powers but where parliamentary bodies and Members have to reach beyond formal 
competences in order to make an impact informally and shape policies (Thym 2009: 19). Impact 
internally on the position of EU institutions and Member States as well as externally on policies and 
actions of third partners are rather indirect but reach further than the normative parliamentary powers 
stipulated under the Treaty may suggest (Ibid: 20). Such impact broadly aims at pursuing EP priorities 
in EU foreign policy, notably to promote a more coherent and cohesive European external action, to 
pursue a more strategic approach in the shaping of EU priorities and to uphold democracy and the rule 
of law in relations with third partners.  
3.2.1 Parliamentary competences in the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CFSP is an inter-governmental area where binding and non-binding arrangements are combined 
providing room for formal and informal parliamentary influence in policy-making. It is a matter, 
however, pre-dominantly at the discretion of the Council and its Member States.  
Although formal powers have somewhat intensified due to the last treaty changes, Parliament’s 
post-Lisbon competences in CFSP largely remain the same as before and Member States continue to 
be the key source of legitimacy, in particular as regards the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). Even though the EP has been constantly empowered in other fields of European external 
action, this was – due to “conceptual considerations” (Thym 2009: 16-17) - not the case with respect 
to CFSP/CSDP decision-making despite the fact that the Council acts as a legislative and executive 
organ in this policy field. Some observers call this “collusive delegation” whereby national executives 
have established an inter-governmental policy to escape national parliamentary control without 
establishing an oversight at the supranational level (Lalone 2005: 39).  
Nevertheless, the Parliament is not completely powerless and it aims at making CFSP more 
coherent and transparent in order to maintain public support and popular commitment for the EU’s 
global engagement (Albertini 2010: 1). It primarily enjoys treaty-based information and consultation 
rights under Article 36 TEU with collaborative arrangements established. In this context, the High 
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Representative is invited to regularly consult Parliament “on the main aspects and basic choices” of 
the CFSP and CSDP by presenting an annual report to the EP and participating in twice-yearly 
parliamentary debates (in addition to regular discussions in the Committee on Foreign Affairs) 
covering the full range of current EU foreign policy activities. Members can also address questions 
and make recommendations to the Council without, however, a formal obligation to be provided with 
relevant answers. A rather undervalued and unused treaty provision concerns the phrase of Article 36, 
which obliges the HR/VP to “...ensure that (Parliament’s) views are taken duly into consideration”4. 
An invitation to tango to shape policies by considering the particular positions and views produced by 
the EP and its Members on the thematic and geographical issues of EU foreign policy – an enhanced 
follow-up mechanism may facilitate the implementation of this commitment.  
A variety of other instruments of non-binding nature help Members to make an (indirect) impact on 
CFSP policy issues and developments. Under the 2002 EP-Council inter-institutional agreement 
concerning access to sensitive information, five Members (plus one substitute) of an EP special 
committee gained access to confidential Council documents and briefings. According to the former 
Chair of Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, however, the range, detail and quality of the 
requested information remains unsatisfactory and the related procedures cumbersome (Albertini 2010: 
2). Another inter-institutional agreement agreed between the Parliament and Council in 2006 on 
budgetary discipline and sound financial management provides for joint consultation meetings on the 
financing of the CFSP between the bureaus of Parliament’s Committees on Foreign Affairs and 
Budget on the one hand and the Chair of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on the other. The 
at least five meetings a year aim at assessing the financial implications of decisions adopted by the 
Council in the framework of the CFSP. As such they cover EU civilian missions as well but not 
military operations. Although no formal decisions are taken and parliamentary involvement in the 
financing of EU missions remains limited, Members can obtain first-hand information from a Council 
body on financial planning and spending in the area of CFSP. These regular discussions reach beyond 
their formal remit because Members pro-actively use the opportunity to also state their position on 
broader strategic issues of EU foreign policy including conflict-torn countries and regions.  
3.2.1.1 Informal practices in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
A paradox of the international system is that the “harder” a particular field of foreign policy becomes 
the less parliamentary involvement and control is required to legitimise that field and its policy 
decisions. Security and defence policy is considered by governments an area which, they traditionally 
argue, requires a high degree of secrecy, confidentiality and flexibility in order to be able to act rapidly 
and take decisions efficiently in promoting/defending national/EU security interests (Peters et al. 
2008: 1 and Böcker 2012: 23). On the other hand, this field would exactly qualify to be a subject to 
parliamentary control because security and defence policy decisions are of strategic nature, value-
choices are made and politically allocated, and they may entail potentially high risks for the citizens 
(Lord 2011: 1138-1139). Democratic accountability therefore would be of fundamental importance in 
order to ensure public support (Mittag 2002: 1). 
The CSDP follows the traditional pattern of very limited control rights by Parliament. The EP has 
no formal say to authorise the launch of an EU crisis-management mission, neither a civilian one nor a 
military one. It can neither co-decide on legal obligations nor on individual mission budgets (Wouters 
and Raube 2012: 152). Some information and consultation rights have been enshrined in the Lisbon 
Treaty’s Article 36 which includes CSDP among the fields where the HR/VP has to regularly consult 
Members, primarily via twice-yearly plenary debates and through the informal mechanism of Joint 
Consultation Meetings. Parliament is, however, largely reliant on the Council’s goodwill to receive 
timely and relevant information. In fact, this field suffers of a double democratic deficit since EU MS 
national parliaments are not sufficiently involved either in the scrutiny of its policies and decisions.  
                                                     
4
 Italics by author (PB). 
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In order to compensate for the lack of power in this field, the European Parliament has developed 
informal practices and tools to be able to shape CSDP and provide some sort of democratic scrutiny. It 
regularly addresses questions to the HR/VP and Council, examines policy/capability/institutional 
developments in plenary sessions, committee meetings, in hearings and workshops, sends ad hoc 
missions on field trip as well as adopts (non-binding) own-initiative reports and recommendations. 
Parliament also established a practice of a sort of ex ante scrutiny when Members, in a parliamentary 
resolution, comment on a planned EU mission. In 2004, a Sub-committee on Security and Defence 
was set up under the Committee on Foreign Affairs to provide a forum for deliberations on CSDP 
issues of public concern. This pro-active ambition and attitude is, however, insufficient to provide 
substantial control mechanisms over a policy field exclusively dominated by the Member States in the 
Council. 
3.2.2 Oversight of the European External Action Service 
The European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s “foreign ministry”, has been one of the main 
institutional innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Not a new EU institution but rather a new 
“service” in the EU’s institutional architecture, which is expected to be instrumental in making EU 
external action more coherent by combining relevant forces of the Commission, Council Secretariat 
and Member States, and headed by the “triple-hatted” High Representative/Vice-President. 
The EEAS and the HR/VP are politically accountable to the Council (Batora 2010: 9) and 
democratically controlled by the European Parliament
5
. The creation and regular scrutiny of the EEAS 
has been a reflection on how effectively parliamentary hard and soft powers, formal competences and 
indirect influence can be combined to ensure parliamentary involvement and maximise the EP’s 
impact on EU foreign policy beyond its treaty-based formal role (Wisniewski 2013: 87).  
In the course of setting up the EEAS in 2010 via the so-called “quadrilogue”, MEPs successfully 
combined their (soft) right of consultation on the proposal of the HR/VP with their (hard) legislative 
and budgetary powers over the new staff regulation and the financial regulation in order to ensure EP 
interests and priorities in the operation of the new external service. By doing so, the EEAS gained 
more democratic legitimacy and the Parliament was recognised as an equal player and important 
institutional actor beyond the role formally suggested by the Treaty (Ibid: 100).  
Increased parliamentary influence was reflected in the politically-binding Declaration on Political 
Accountability, which was issued shortly after by the HR/VP on the cooperation between the HR/VP-
EEAS and the Parliament. The Declaration provided inter alia for enhancing the status of the Joint 
Consultation Meetings, affirming the right of the EP Special Committee to access confidential 
information on CFSP/CSDP, mandating the HR/VP to appear before Parliament twice a year and, not 
least, allowing exchanges of views with leading EEAS officials including Heads of Delegation and EU 
Special Representatives.  
The exchange with Heads of EU Delegation has been a major innovation of shaping and 
controlling EU foreign policy. Although initial parliamentary demands for US-style hearings and 
powers of appointment and recall of future EU ambassadors were rejected by Member States, a rather 
successful practice of exchanges was developed. After their appointment by the HR/VP but prior to 
taking up their post in the third country, EU ambassadors, selected upon Parliament’s priorities and in 
agreement with the HR/VP, appear before a closed meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(AFET). They inform Members on the country concerned and the EU priorities/objectives to be 
pursued in relations with the partner country. Even more importantly, Members may use these 
opportunities to question the ambassadors, share their views with them of the particular relationship as 
well as their advice and suggestions on the conduct of the relations. Although Parliament is formally 
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 The Parliament endorses the nomination of the HR/VP as member of the College of Commissioners. (S)he is subject to a 
collective vote of consent by the EP and so accountable to Parliament. 
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not entitled to hinder an appointment or the taking up of ambassadorial duties, the result of such an 
exchange is invaluable: on the one hand, Members’ knowledge, expertise and political insight may 
enrich that particular geographical relationship and, on the other, it may provide the ambassador with a 
democratic legitimacy strengthening the EU’s bearing in the partner country and the ambassador’s 
acceptance in the recipient country. Of course, exchanges of views with appointed EU Special 
Representatives before the launch of their mandate may have a similar effect on the EU’s thematic 
priorities as pursued by the EUSRs. In order to maximise parliamentary impact by regular dialogue, 
both EU ambassadors and EUSRs occasionally return to AFET and report back to Members on 
geographical and thematic policy developments and achievements - this ensures both an informal 
control mechanism and the space for particular shaping of EU policies. 
3.2.3 Regular contacts with third partners 
Parliament serves also as a vehicle for consultation with third partners, countries and international 
organisations. It provides a public forum both for representatives of partner countries and 
organisations, influential non-state actors as well as for leading policy makers from the Council, 
EEAS, Commission and Member States in the pursuit of open bilateral and multilateral relations. In 
the sixth parliamentary term (2004-2009), alone AFET was addressed more than four-hundred times 
by visiting presidents, prime ministers, leading government officials as well as prominent 
representatives of international and non-governmental organisations (Albertini 2010: 2). Parliament is 
widely and increasingly used by external and internal actors as an open forum for pursuing foreign 
policy interests and trying to make an impact on international developments. In this context, the EP 
itself plays a pro-active role to enhance parliamentary diplomacy, complemented by the activities of 
its many inter-parliamentary delegations as well as pre-planned and ad hoc missions to third countries 
by individual Members and various parliamentary bodies. 
Parliament’s ambition and attitude to play an increasing role in international relations, combined 
with the formal and informal powers acquired to be used in bringing the cause of EU foreign policy 
forward, have enhanced its authority on the international scene. The EP has become a respected and 
influential international actor over the years, an institution perceived by partners to be capable of 
exerting influence on developments and decisions both externally and internally. It succeeded in 
projecting a united and coherent image abroad and it obtained a level of international perception 
among many third partners and observers which often go beyond the treaty-based roles and 
competences it actually enjoys.  
3.2.4 Democracy promotion including election observation  
Being perceived on the international scene as a capable moral force with strong focus on strengthening 
human rights, promoting democracy and enhancing the rule of law worldwide, the Parliament is 
increasingly (asked to be) involved in the building of parliamentary democracy, a notion believed to 
be a stabilising factor domestically and in international relations overall.  
Based on the EU’s comprehensive democracy support policy as an integral part of European 
external action and emerging as from the late 2000s, democratisation would not just be promoted by 
the EP during the election period as it used to be with the monitoring of parliamentary elections but 
throughout the full electoral cycle, particularly following the elections. EP real added value was 
understood to be moving beyond election observation to have a comprehensive impact on the process 
of democratisation in a particular country by maximising the contribution to broader democracy-
building efforts.  
In 2007, the Parliament set up the Office for the Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD) 
with the primary aim to engage in demand-driven, technical and capacity-building assistance to 
strengthen the role of parliaments in democratisation processes. It has the objectives of supporting 
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parliaments to enhance their institutional capacity in implementing the essential functions of law-
making, oversight and representation. In Parliament’s democracy support programme, priority is given 
to the parliaments of countries of the Eastern neighbourhood but support is also provided among 
others to the Pan-African Parliament, the parliaments of ECOWAS, SADC, EAC
6
 as well as to 
regional parliaments in Latin America. Of course, election observation has remained a key instrument 
in promoting democratisation, with the EP organising some 10-12 election observation missions to 
countries agreed beforehand with the Commission and the EEAS. MEPs are normally the EU chief 
observers of such missions under the EU flag. 
3.3 Tools of parliamentary control 
“Scrutiny is a bit boring. We want to...shape the emergence of common policies.” (Wouters and Raube 
2012: 158). The opinion expressed by an MEP might not be representative but reflects Parliament’s 
ambition and attitude to act as a recognised institutional player in EU foreign policy. Nevertheless, 
over the years the European Parliament has acquired all those tools and mechanism of parliamentary 
control which are also available to other directly elected national parliaments. They are rule-based 
tools rooted in Parliament’s Rules of Procedure or informal instruments and practices developed to 
enhance oversight functions.  
In order to make the executive accountable, Parliament can raise questions, hold interpellations, 
organise public debates (both on plenary and committee level) including hearings and workshops, 
adopt resolutions and own-initiative reports, set up special committees of inquiry, confirm 
appointments and launch no-confidence and impeachment procedures. The most widely used tools are 
the (written and oral) questions, public debates and resolutions/reports.  
While over the years the EP has obtained and made pro-actively use of such instruments also in the 
field of foreign affairs, it is increasingly challenged, as all other parliaments today, by the need to 
effectively and consistently apply them to maximise the very parliamentary task of control over 
executive actions and decisions. This requires inter alia, on the one hand, to be able to create popular 
demand from European societies and sustain it through the media and, on the other, to enhance 
internal expert capacities capable of translating ever-complex issues initiated/governed by the 
executive into issues comprehensible to EU citizens. Access to the necessary information from all 
relevant sources and the ability to absorb and make effective use of them appear to be crucial in this 
context.  
3.4 EP parliamentary bodies in the field of external policies 
At the beginning of the 8th parliamentary term, altogether there are some 116 political bodies dealing 
with various aspects of parliamentary foreign policy, covering relations with about 190 countries in 
the world. They include inter alia some 3 standing committees, 2 subcommittees, 44 standing inter-
parliamentary delegations, including 4 multilateral assemblies, and a high number of working groups, 
steering committees (DG EXPO Handbook 2012: 6). The coordination and cooperation of these 
various bodies and how to ensure coherence of action are a challenging task. The main bodies and 
their duties are the following: 
3.4.1 The President 
Under Rule 22 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, the President’s formal duty is to represent the 
European Parliament in international relations. Parliament’s main office-holder, elected for a term of 
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two and a half years, pursues and defends Parliament’s relevant positions within the EU and on the 
international scene. A number of the fourteen elected vice-presidents are dealing with particular 
aspects of parliamentary foreign policy and assist the President in the conduct of his/her duties. 
3.4.2 The Conference of Presidents (CoP) 
Composed of the heads of political groups, the CoP is responsible for the broad political direction of 
Parliament, both internally and vis-à-vis external partners. It regularly discusses and takes decisions of 
strategic nature, holds exchanges with high-ranking representatives of EU Institutions, Member States 
and third countries, and decides among others on the sending of planned and ad hoc missions abroad. 
Its decisions are implemented by the Bureau, which consist of the President and the 14 Vice-
Presidents. 
3.4.3 Political parties 
Political parties on the national and European level play an increasingly influential role in the 
European Parliament’s involvement in EU policies including foreign policy – they have become a 
factor of European integration (Calossi and Coticchia 2013: 4). While the EU voters’ will is directly 
legitimised through the election of MEPs normally on the various national party lists, the party groups 
in the EP, loose conglomerates of national sister parties, constitute a common institutional 
denominator of voters’ interests and priorities including in the area of external policies. Based on this 
legitimacy and accountability, they do not simply provide a forum for deliberations but shape policies 
aimed at wide cross-party consensus both on the plenary and committee levels as well as in the 
Conference of Presidents. 
3.4.4 Standing committees and sub-committees 
Out of Parliament’s 20 standing committees, some 3 (Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on 
Development, Committee on International Trade) are directly dealing with the parliamentary 
dimension of particular areas of European external action. Committees are composed of full and 
(equal number of) substitute Members. A very significant role in the Committee is played by the group 
coordinators. At the beginning of the legislative term, each political group designates a coordinator as 
its spokesperson for a particular committee. The coordinators meet in the Committee’s Enlarged 
Bureau to discuss the Committee’s agenda and outstanding political issues before full discussion in the 
Committee. Coordinators also share out the workload among the members of their own group and help 
to establish the voting position of their group. Another significant role is played by the rapporteurs, 
who are appointed by the Committee to be in charge of a particular dossier or report and who represent 
the Committee on those matters. Their work is complemented and assisted by shadow rapporteurs, 
who are appointed by the other political groups.  
Parliament’s largest committee (76 full members) is the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET). It 
is assisted by two subcommittees: one on security and defence (SEDE) and the other on human rights 
(DROI). In addition, a number of working groups help the full Committee to establish positions on 
particular areas of EU foreign policy i.e. the working groups on EU-UN relations, on the Western 
Balkans, on the Eastern Neighbourhood, on the Southern Neighbourhoodt and on the various External 
Financial Instruments. Unlike other parliamentary committees, AFET rarely deals with legislation 
with the exception of the preparation of consent to accession treaties, international agreements as well 
as involvement in the ordinary legislative procedures on the external financial instruments once every 
seven years. Its positions and views are mainly formulated in so-called own-initiative reports (INIs), 
which are non-legislative reports on strategically important geographical or thematic priority subjects. 
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This Committee also regularly discusses and adopts recommendations and interim reports
7
 as well as 
sends pre-planned and ad hoc missions abroad like the ones, of particular significance for EU foreign 
policy recently, to Washington in the wake of the revelation on mass surveillance activities by the 
NSA or during the Ukrainian political crisis in February 2014 to Kiev. A substantial work of AFET 
consists of controlling or monitoring the activities of the Commission, the Council, the HR/VP and the 
EEAS.  
3.4.5 Standing inter-parliamentary delegations 
Over the last more than forty years, the Parliament has established a wide range of bilateral, regional 
and multilateral inter-parliamentary delegations. Today there exist some 44 such permanent 
delegations covering relations to some 190 countries, with some 944 seats available for MEPs (Corbett 
and Jacobs and Shakleton 2011: 178). Depending on the legal nature of the EU’s agreement with a 
third country or group of countries, inter-parliamentary cooperation is conducted via Joint 
Parliamentary Committees (JPCs) with enlargement countries, Parliamentary Cooperation Committees 
(PCCs) with countries having partnership and cooperation agreements with the EU, through 
Interparliamentary Meetings (IPMs) and five Multilateral Assemblies (ACP-EU JPA, EUROLAT, PA-
UfM, EURONEST, NATO PA
8
). In reflecting EP political priorities, the number of delegations have 
increased in the 8
th
 term to include, for instance, a delegation with relations to Brazil and individual 
delegations with each country of the Western Balkans. 
Inter-parliamentary delegations are important instruments of EP parliamentary diplomacy. Through 
their regular exchanges with third country parliamentarians, they promote EP/EU positions and views 
and, by doing so, may shape policies by influencing third country MPs and, indirectly through them, 
third country governments. They also provide useful insights into developments within a country 
which may prove instrumental for the EP’s/the EU’s assessment of that particular partner leading to 
policy actions and decisions. Recognising the importance of the permanent delegations in the 
parliamentary dimension of EU foreign policy, the Parliament aims to rationalise their functioning by 
better forward planning, more streamlined organisation and, foremost, by better channelling their work 
into the mainstream activities of standing committees through mandates issued by committees prior to 
travelling and through better mechanisms of reporting back to committees afterwards.  
3.4.6 “Control vacuum” – EP cooperation with EU MS national parliaments 
The Lisbon Treaty is widely praised as the “Treaty of Parliaments” because it enhanced the 
parliamentary involvement of EU MS national parliaments and the European Parliament in EU 
governance, including their role in the foreign policy architecture of the EU, in order to improve 
democratic accountability. The complementary role of Parliaments within the EU system have been 
recognised by creating treaty provisions allowing a strengthened inter-parliamentary cooperation, 
particularly in the inter-governmental grey zone of the CFSP and CSDP where Member States remain 
the key sources of legitimacy (Böcker 2012: 19) and where a “control vacuum” has been evident for 
long.  
Indeed, while national parliaments hold, though to a greatly varying extent and without any 
standardised way, their respective governments accountable to their actions within the Council, they 
are not entitled to exercise control over decisions taken collectively in the Council (the final collective 
decision may not be necessarily identical with the individual position of a Member State in the 
                                                     
7
 In the course of the 7th legislative term (2009-2014), AFET adopted some 104 reports, 46 INIs and 99 opinions. 
8
 ACP EU JPA = ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, EUROLAT = Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, 
PA-UfM = Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean, EURONEST = Euronest Parliamentary 
Assembly, NATO PA = NATO Parliamentary Assembly 
Péter Bajtay 
20 
Council) (Lord 2011: 1142). Since the EP, a supranational EU institution, has not gained control 
functions over the Council operating on the basis of inter-governmental cooperation, the collective 
actions and decisions of this organ are formally not subject to parliamentary control. In short, while 
the EP may have a vision on the whole, the national parliaments only have a view on the part (The 
democratic control 2010 p.2.). Or, to reflect this ambiguity in the example of the financing of CSDP 
military missions, while the EP has no formalised influence over EU military operations, national 
parliaments can only determine national defence budgets
9
.  
The solution to fill this control gap was proposed, on the basis of Article 9 of Protocol 1 attached to 
the Lisbon Treaty, to be the Interparliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. This body, finally agreed by the EU Speakers Conference in April 2011, was to replace the 
dissolved WEU Parliamentary Assembly which had previously been a sort of scrutiny organ for the 
CSDP. It is composed of delegations of EU MS national parliaments (six MPs each) and the European 
Parliament (sixteen MEPs), complemented with some 24 MPs from European non-EU countries and 
EU candidate states, bringing the total number of Conference members to 208 (!). Since 2012, the 
Conference meets once every six months under the respective EU Presidency and it primarily provides 
a forum for the exchange of information between European and national parliamentarians concerning 
CFSP and CSDP. It may adopt non-binding conclusions by consensus on these policy areas.  
The Conference functions as an interparliamentary assembly, which, however, has come short of 
joint control functions since it does not embrace any parliamentary control over the Council including 
no right to confidential or sensitive information. Some observers even question its real value added in 
joint parliamentary accountability - where an efficient institutionalised combination of the EP’s 
horizontal checks with the vertical checks exercised by national parliaments would have been 
expected - and its real impact/efficiency given its huge membership (Wouters and Raube 2012: 162).  
Conclusions 
The European Union is building a democracy on its own. As acknowledged and stipulated by the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Union is founded on “representative democracy”, which is rooted in the diverging 
traditions of political culture of the Member States and legitimised by the will of EU citizens through 
the directly elected European Parliament. Such “double legitimacy” is also reflected in the peculiar 
nature of the EU’s democratic order, with particular implications on policy-making in the field of 
European external action.  
On the one hand, Member State governments dominate Union foreign policy on the basis of well-
known and traditional arguments: the need for “instrumental efficiency”, specialised expertise to 
resolve ever-growing complexity of international issues, secrecy, confidentiality and flexibility in 
order to be able to act and react rapidly in defending/promoting EU values and interests within the 
quickly changing international environment. In many instances, “expert sovereignty” continues to 
prevail over “popular or parliamentary sovereignty”, creating inter-institutional and political tensions.  
On the other, the citizen representatives in the Parliament enjoy a rather wide-spread political 
autonomy. They are not necessarily constrained by the traditional government-parliament set-up and 
therefore have the potential to develop an own policy identity with the opportunity to pursue 
autonomous foreign policy not necessarily in line with actions pursued by the other institutional 
actors. Over the last years and decades of the European integration process, the Parliament has built up 
a reputation of the guardian of European values, a strong promoter of democracy, the rule of law and 
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human rights, a driving force of political conditionality in the EU’s external relations. It has 
established itself as a recognised international actor perceived internally and by third partners as an 
institution capable to exert influence over Union decision-making and international developments. The 
more so despite the fact that it has not become an equal player in all fields of European external action 
and that it has been more substantially empowered with respect to internal policies than in the external 
sphere, in particular as regards CFSP and CSDP. Factors like authority, ability, attitude and ambition 
have been, however, decisive driving forces in this development. 
Is increasing parliamentary involvement in shaping and controlling Union foreign policy a 
welcome development? What are the mutual benefits of parliamentary diplomacy and oversight? More 
actors inevitably add to the structural complexity of EU foreign policy, challenging the ultimate 
necessity for effective, coherent and consistent European external action, expected by third partners as 
well. Also, at first glance, more complex settings are not necessarily “citizen-friendly” since they 
make it even more difficult for the public to see clearly how “Brussels” functions in this domain.  
But the EP ambition is not to duplicate, replace or compete with actions and policies of other 
institutional stakeholders including the Member State governments. The role of individual MEPs and 
Parliament as an EU institution is to enrich and stimulate ideas and policies, provide impulses, 
direction and follow up to Union actions. They can bring experience, expertise and political insight 
inter alia in bilateral and multilateral relations, conflict prevention and political dialogue. In this highly 
politicised area where choices of values and strategies are made with long-lasting implications and 
potential risks for EU citizens, sufficient parliamentary involvement is a fundamental necessity to 
ensure public support of the choices made. Parliament also functions as a public space for citizens, 
institutional stakeholders and third partners. In this context, the exposure to diverse views on strategic 
direction and policy priorities would not undermine effective actions but diminish potential risks for 
erroneous judgements and provide the democratic legitimacy necessary to pursue a policy based on 
public acceptance. By providing political support to complex policies and initiatives, Parliament 
democratically legitimises actions and, by doing so, also strengthens the hand of Union policy-makers 
and gives more political weight to their actions resulting, principally, in greater EU leverage and 
impact on third partners on the international scene. Lack of information or difficulties in accessing 
them do not only restrict parliamentary involvement but, as a consequence, may also bear negative 
implications on the EU’s external relations. Overall, it constrains Parliament in one of its main 
functions, namely to build up public trust by being able to translate ever-complex issues in a way 
comprehensible to EU citizens. In this respect, Parliament’s role is to build bridges between the 
increasing public demand for more legitimacy and the growing complexity of issues requiring 
specialised expertise.  
However, times are challenging to the further parliamentarisation of EU foreign policy. The 
accumulation over the years of more parliamentary legitimacy and powers, considered to tackle what 
is perceived a “democratic deficit”, has not been accompanied by growing public trust of the European 
project. Elitism, over-bureaucracy, complexity and the inability to communicate results continue to be 
evident features of the European integration process in the public view. Member States, the key 
stakeholders in the process, are struck by the consequences of the crisis and appear to become more 
introverted and passive towards the outside world (Zielonka 2013: 5), as also reflected by the 
significantly reduced level of financial resources made available to European external action under the 
MFF for the period 2014-2020
10
. In some respects, signs of a re-nationalisation of EU foreign policy 
can also be detected which reinforces the limits to the EU to further develop own policies including 
their parliamentary dimension. 
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Still, foreign policy can be efficient and democratic at the same time, as seen in a number of cases 
of EU external action. The question should not be whether to strike a balance between legitimacy and 
efficiency but how to do so. In the post-Lisbon framework and under the pressing circumstances 
challenging the European project, treaty-based and informal achievements need to be consolidated by 
improving inter-institutional cooperation for the sake of building a collective ownership of EU foreign 
policy based on public acceptance. The response to the “how” concerns no less than the quality of an 
EU representative democracy we aspire to live in. 
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